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SECURITIZATION THROUGH RE-ENCHANTMENT: THE STRATEGIC USES 




The concept of ontological security has come to be associated in late-modern sociology 
with the loss of moorings in a global order of what Bauman refers to as unsicherheit, a 
combination of risk, doubt, fear, mistrust and insecurity. 1 A global order in which the 
modernist anchors of class, gender, race, religion and nation have been called 
increasingly into question renders the process of identity acquisition a matter of danger, 
but also of opportunity for some. 2  Along with other citizens in the contemporary world, 
many Canadians have experienced ontological insecurity and existential anxiety. 3 Mitzen 
refers to ontological security as: ‘the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous 
person in time’. 4 Ontological insecurity is further associated with the confusion, doubt 
and mistrust that comes from competing sources of collective identity. Lacking a clear 
and coherent sense of personal identity, citizens become increasingly disenchanted and 
disengaged from the political process.  
 
As we shall see in the Canadian cases under consideration in this article, the attainment of 
ontological security does not necessitate either essentialism or monological reasoning 
with regard to one’s social identity. In fact tolerance of ambiguity when it comes to one’s 
identity is the basis of an ontologically secure openness to plurality, inclusivity, and 
diversity. Irrespective of this, certain entrepreneurs of identity, including dominant forces 
within the State, may choose to privilege and promote particular collective narratives and 
myths in order to furnish discursive anchors that will attach large groups of citizens to 
specific constructions of political reality and political projects. To the extent that such 
uses of myth and memory succeed in galvanizing and mobilizing a large enough group of 
citizens on the basis of a shared re-enchantment, the dominant political forces are 




This article brings together research traditions in ontological security, securitization 
studies, and the analysis of (dis)(re)enchantment in order to illustrate the strategic use of 
discourses and the shaping of regimes of signification surrounding the construction of 
national myths. 5 We examine the role of the government in the promotion of collective 
identities and the building of regimes of signification. The central contention of the 
article is that the Canadian Conservative government of Stephen Harper, which governed 
from 2006-2015, largely failed in its attempt to re-enchant Canadians through the 
displacement of a pre-existing liberal regime and its replacement with a more securitized 
regime of signification. The Harper government attempted to reframe Canadian 
narratives and myths, promoting those that challenged the liberal regime of postcolonial 
citizenship, multiple and hybridized belonging, seeking to supplant them with more 
traditional narratives of Anglo-conformist nationalism and loyalism. The methodological 
approach adopted in the analysis of the three cases is a discourse analysis of government 
documents and transcripts of speeches. Three sites of discursive intervention are 
investigated to illustrate the strategic work of the Harper government in shifting the 
dominant regime of signification: (1) National Museum and Archive policy, specifically 
the renaming of the Canadian national museum; (2) the militarization and royalization of 
national institutions and commemorations, notably the renaming of the Canadian navy 
and; (3) the privileging of anglo-centric and loyalist tropes in the performance of 
citizenship rituals, and associated with this, reforming Citizenship legislation.  
 
Canada: The Colonial and Postcolonial Context  
 
Each of these three initiatives represents an attempt to recover the boundedness and 
connectivity of conservative and colonial Canada in the face of a pre-existing liberal 
cosmopolitical and hybridized postcolonial identity. It is evident throughout the analysis 
of these changes that the strategic goal of changing the regime of signification requires 
considerable hegemonic work on the part of the government and its supporters. The pre-
existing and long-standing liberal social order that the Harper Conservative government 
sought to supplant remains profoundly popular and embedded. As we shall see, the 




While the impact of coloniality with regard to Indigenous Canadians continues to shape 
the present in profound ways,6 Canada’s history as a white settler outpost of European 
empires, with no further colonial history of its own beyond internal colonization, 
constitutes the basis for the evolution of ideologies and discourses of nationality in 
Canada. The coexistence of balanced and powerful ethnoreligious minorities in Canada’s 
past, the French Catholic and English Protestant communities of the 18th and 19th 
centuries, sustained a politics of elite accommodation, evident in the historical 
compromises of the Quebec Act of 1775, the Constitutional Act of 1791, the introduction 
of Responsible Government in the late 1840s, and the Constitution Act of 1867.7 Under 
these constitutional developments, the colonial hegemony of the British North American 
Empire was always balanced and tempered through the French fact, the survival of first 
nations, as well as through the evolution of a federal state based de facto upon strong 
provinces.  
 
Ironically, it was on the basis of such a conservative social order that the preconditions 
emerged for cultural pluralism, communitarianism, accommodationist ethnic policies, 
multiculturalism, and diversity.8 While the bases of these cultural traditions were 
mediated through Canadian loyalism to the British connection and adherence to a 
monarchical order, the communitarian development of Canada as a ‘community of 
communities’ established the cultural grounds for pluralism and multiculturalism. A key 
moment in the development of contemporary liberal Canada was the creation of the 
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963), under the leadership of 
Liberal Prime Ministers Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau. The work of this commission 
eventually produced Canada’s official bilingualism and multicultural policies, which 
entrenched a pluralistic civic nationhood in which membership of communities was 
grounded in individual choice and the premise that Canada’s communities would strive 
for co-operation, communication, and collaboration in a broader civil society. In the face 
of an aggressive and troubled United States in the 1960s, at war in Vietnam and 
experiencing the upheavals of the civil rights movement, an assertive pan-Canadian 
nationalism conditioned the emergence of a distinctive and independent Canadian civic 
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nationality, combining liberal individualism with an openness to collective identities. The 
public policy face of this liberal regime was constructed around the introduction of 
official multiculturalism (1971), the Foreign Investment Review Agency (1973), a series 
of nationalized industries and crown corporations, notably Petro-Canada (1975), the 
Citizenship Act (1977), and the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. 
Each of these policies contributed to an evolving regime of signification in which 
individual freedom, a sense of independent civic nationhood, and a communitarian 
recognition of diverse communities combined to shape a liberal social order. While the 
deep cultural traditions of accommodation and tolerance for diversity continued, these 
governmental and legislative changes both reflected and further conditioned shifts in the 
political culture and political economy of Canada away from the traditional. They 
highlighted a break with the largely Anglo-conformist heritage of Canada toward a more 
cosmopolitical, pluralistic and progressive polity that entered Canadian society.9 Notable 
among the changes was the passage of the 1977 Citizenship Act, which removed the prior 
discrimination in favour of British Subjects over Aliens. The liberal social order forged a 
unified civil society in which ethno-cultural particularisms and social norms were matters 
of individual volition rather than collective attribution. The liberal social order was in 
general highly regarded and the various changes it conditioned became highly popular.10 
Both the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and official multiculturalism remain highly 
popular and defining characteristics of Canadian civic nationality, the attachment to 
which and sense of collective identity from its citizens remains high.11  
 
Securitization and Re-enchantment 
 
The concept of ‘securitization’, theorized by the Copenhagen School of International 
Relations, brings together the structural analyses of global forces and relations with 
phenomenological analyses of the circumstances under which such forces and relations 
come to be socially constructed as threats by political and other leaders, and the 
consequent political projects they establish to counter such threats.12 To securitize an 
issue challenges society to promote its value by committing greater resources to solve the 
related problems through confrontation and compulsion, while desecuritization means 
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removing an issue from the realm of politics of existential survival thus making it easier 
to resolve through cooperative means.13 Mitzen’s analysis focuses on states as actors. She 
argues that ‘states seek to secure their identity as a particular kind of actor’.14 Both 
Mitzen and Kinnvall develop the concept of the securitization of subjectivity, by which is 
meant the recourse to familiar and trusted anchors and markers of identity that often 
invoke myths, parables and other metanarratives associated with the nation, religion and 
gender.15 Such bids to securitize are intolerant of ambiguity, uncritical and essentializing, 
promoting black and white perspectives, boundary making and an us and them mentality.  
 
The concept of disenchantment was first theorized in the work of Max Weber, who took 
the expression from Schiller.16 The concept describes the loss of a sense of spiritual and 
affective attachment that is associated with growing secularization and bureaucratization 
in modern society. The late modern onset of existential anxieties and ontological 
insecurities can be expressed in certain ways as a deepening of disenchantment through 
diminishing trust in grand narratives and established institutions, combined with a 
generalized uncertainty, fear and insecurity. The potential for re-enchantment arises 
through two principal channels, according to Jenkins: First, recourse to everyday 
explanatory frameworks that transcend rationalist and logical explanations; and, second, 
collective attachments that counter and even stand in opposition to rationalism. Jenkins 
exemplifies the first as including ‘frameworks of luck and fate; long-established or 
‘traditional’ spiritual beliefs; ‘alternative’ or ‘new age’ beliefs; and ‘weird science’.17 The 
second category includes: ‘collective attachments such as ethnicity; sexualities; 
intoxications and ecstasies; the escapism of television, computer games, and the internet; 
and consumerist cultural hedonism’.18 The political arena constitutes a site in which 
entrepreneurs of identity can attempt to shape re-enchantment through the use of 
symbols, metanarratives, myths, event planning, public architecture, rhetoric, and 
spectacle. For Klein historical memory is mythico-religious.19 Klein’s analysis of 
historical memory reveals that memory can constitute forms of re-enchantment that are 
counter-hegemonic and run counter to the canons of the received historical record, 
thereby empowering and validating the lives of marginalized peoples. At the same time, 






In the context of pre-existing widespread support for the liberal social order, the Harper 
Conservatives attempted to re-enchant certain Canadian myths of nationhood and did so 
in part by calling into question and limiting the authority and impact of those agencies 
that might challenge their social conservative narratives and discourses in their attempt to 
‘crush once and for all what remains of the left’s agenda [and] its vision of a just 
society’.20 This included environmental agencies, wayward backbenchers, the Courts, 
government scientists and Statistics Canada. In a 2013 survey of professional public 
servants, 24 percent reported being often or sometimes asked to exclude or alter technical 
information for non-scientific reasons. A further 37 percent reported being prevented 
from answering questions on their areas of expertise from the media or the public.21 By 
calling such agencies into question, the moorings of authority and scientific certainty 
were substantially loosened. Such loosening opened the way to new hegemonies as 
regimes of signification were reshaped. As Brubaker notes, ‘Nationhood is not an 
unambiguous social fact; it is a contestable – and often contested – political claim’.22 The 
tropes of nationhood are produced and consumed in a specific cultural economy. The 
Conservatives attempted to reshape who was employed in the production of cultural 
knowledge and how much control they exerted over their labour process and technologies 
of cultural production, and through attempting to influence the dissemination and 
conditions of reception of such knowledge, they actively reshaped the regime of 
signification.  
 
Securitizing measures were substantially enhanced under the Harper Conservatives, with 
a broad range of new legislation on border control, immigration, citizenship and counter-
terrorism. The general law and order agenda of the government included moves such as 
increasing mandatory minimum sentences in a climate of declining crime, introducing 
victims’ rights legislation, and defunding health programs designed to help drug 
addicts.23 Given Canada’s broad political cultural support for the core values of the 
Pearson and Trudeau era, notably support for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and for 
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multiculturalism, the Harper Conservatives’ criticisms of the liberal social order were 
initially muted and covert. Harper’s goal was to win over Canadians to social 
conservative values through gradual change and multiple small and seemingly 
insignificant acts that taken together shifted the cultural landscape. The general thrust of 
Harper’s social conservative project of transformation was evident in a speech he made to 
Civitas, a right-wing thinkers group, in 2003 in which he criticized the ideas of the left: 
 
The real challenge is therefore not economic, but the social agenda of the modern 
Left. Its system of moral relativism, moral neutrality and moral equivalency is 
beginning to dominate its intellectual debate and public-policy objectives [….] It 
has moved beyond old socialistic morality or even moral relativism to something 
much darker. It has become a moral nihilism – the rejection of any tradition or 
convention of morality, a post-Marxism with deep resentments, even hatreds of 
free and democratic western civilization [….] we need to rediscover Burkean or 
social conservatism because a growing body of evidence points to the damage the 
welfare state is having on our most important institutions, particularly the 
family.24  
 
The covertness of Harper’s approach was evident when he later stated that ‘real gains are 
inevitably incremental [….] The explicitly moral orientation of social conservatives 
makes it difficult for many to accept the incremental approach. Yet in democratic 
politics, any other approach will certainly fail [….] conservatives should be satisfied if 
the agenda is moving in the right direction, even if slowly’. 
 
The Conservative project was to shape a new social agenda that would benefit the party 
at election time through the cultivation and expansion of a moderate conservative middle 
ground of support. The Harper Conservatives often quietly and covertly unfolded a series 
of strategic and tactical interventions as well as policy initiatives designed to roll back the 




Invoking the generalized perceptions of risk and threats to security in Canada, 
particularly in a post 9/11 context, the Harper Conservatives attempted to re-enchant 
certain Canadian metanarratives through the invocation of a conservative patriotism. 
There are direct parallels here to Stuart Croft’s work on the construction of ‘Britishness’ 
and how this has contributed to both the securitization of the majority population as well 
as the insecuritization of Muslim minorities since 9/11.26 Harper’s project was focused on 
symbols and metanarratives of Canada as a proud military nation, the Crown and the 
monarchy, family values, and conformity to a set of conservative civic virtues. As a 
corollary, the Conservatives eroded and undermined a series of pre-existing liberal 
metanarratives of Canada as a peacekeeper, and honest broker in the world between the 
global South and the advanced world as well as the West and the East. It called into 
question the core elements of Canada as a pluralistic multicultural state and a socially 
progressive and environmentally conscious country. In brief, a central project of the 
Harper Conservatives was to root out the liberal social order and to re-enchant a social 
conservative order anticipated to slowly transform the political culture and institutions of 
Canadian politics. In this regard, they were attempting to accomplish what Brent Steele 
characterizes as ‘consistent self-concepts’ that would anchor the Canadian state through 
forms of routinized foreign policy.27 As we shall see, the attempt to impose such a 
uniform and monological narrative ultimately foundered in the face of the dominance of 
Canada’s diverse, contested and open regime of signification. 
 
Harper attempted to re-enchant the myths of the imperial British connection and as 
Canada as a loyal outpost of empire. In his first major speech made outside Canada, to 
the UK Chamber of Commerce, Harper referred to Canada’s past in the following terms: 
 
[… ] much of what Canada is today we can trace to our origins as a colony of 
the British Empire. Now I know it’s unfashionable to refer to colonialism in 
anything other than negative terms. And certainly, no part of the world is 
unscarred by the excesses of empires. But in the Canadian context, the actions 




Paying homage to Winston Churchill Harper drew on an image of Canada as 
hegemonically white, Anglo-Saxon and masculine and a Canada of deference toward the 
elites with an associated set of Burkean social conservative values on Crown, loyalty, 
nation and family. It is this blending of securitization with re-enchantment that we 
examine throughout the remainder of this article.  
 
Renaming the Canadian Navy 
 
The Harper Conservatives accentuated the British connection in many ways. Embassies 
around the world and the Department of Foreign Affairs were ordered to hang images of 
Queen Elizabeth in prominent places. From 2012 - 2015 certain Canadian embassies 
closed and reduced Canadian staffs took up residence as lodgers in British embassies in a 
direct symbolic move that placed official Canada literally under the British flag, thereby 
symbolically shrinking Canadian sovereignty. Harper referred to the UK – and Canada’s 
connection to it – as: ‘the “little island” and the “Great Dominion” … eternally bonded 
by language, culture, economics and values’.29 
 
Despite the historical experiences of Canada in claiming and pursuing an independent 
foreign and defence policy from the First World War onward, including a successful 
Second World War naval campaign in which Canada emerged as a global force, the 
bonds of attachment to Britain continued to be strong. Following the Second World War, 
there was a generalized sense among Canada’s political class as well as the junior officers 
and ratings in the Royal Canadian Navy – as it was known at that time – that its senior 
officer class was a cohort of extreme anglophiles, who insisted on regarding the Canadian 
navy as an extension of the British navy and of propagating archaic British customs that 
were increasingly out-of-place in the Canadian context. One example was Rear Admiral 
Harold T. Grant who insisted on sending all junior officers to Britain to complete their 
training, removed all ‘Canada’ flashes from uniforms, ordered officers to remove the 
word ‘Canada from their uniforms and removed maple leaf symbols from ship funnels in 
the fleet’.30 In 1963, one of the old guard, Rear Admiral Jeffrey Brock, made the mistake 
of putting on a show of pomp and ceremony in order to impress the new Liberal Minister 
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of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, on a visit to Halifax. Hellyer was appalled at what he 
regarded as ‘an abuse of indentured labour reminiscent of the dark ages’.31 Under 
Hellyer, the armed forces were unified in the years 1966 to 1968 and the use of the term 
‘Royal’ in the navy and air force was discontinued in 1968. He then presided over a 
Canadianization and modernization of the navy in moves designed to bring the armed 
forces into conformity with the liberal social order. The emphasis was on the 
consolidation of a small professional military, specialized in peacekeeping. Traditional 
distinctive uniforms of the army, air force and navy were abandoned, to be resurrected 
under the Mulroney Conservative government in the mid 1980s. 
 
The Harper Conservatives came in determined to re-enchant Canada as a courageous and 
muscular military nation, and took advantage of the year to celebrate the War of 1812 as 
a chosen glory of the Canadian nation.32 Further militarization characterized preparations 
for the spectacle of 2017, Canada’s 150th anniversary. Harper and his colleagues were 
determined to rid Canada of what they perceived as decades of Liberal indifference 
toward the military and to redefine Canada as a fighting nation.33 Examples of how the 
Harper Conservatives made symbolic use of politics was in the 2007 designation of a 170 
kilometre stretch of Highway 401 as ‘The Highway of Heroes’ and the plan to erect a 
‘Mother Canada’ statue in Cape Breton, depicting a 24 metre-tall statue of a grieving 
woman, arms outstretched toward Europe.34 There was relatively little parliamentary 
debate on the matter of the proposed renaming of the navy. However, in 2010, the Senate 
Committee on National Security and Defence took up the issue. In those debates, while 
there was a consensus view that the term ‘Canadian Navy’ should replace ‘Maritime 
Command’, there was a split on whether ‘Royal’ should be added.35 
 
Those speaking in favour downplayed the British and imperial connections and made the 
argument that a ‘Royal’ navy expressed a proud and distinctive Canadian tradition under 
the Crown. The strongest supporter of this view was witness Ian Holloway, Dean of Law 
at the University of Western Ontario and naval reservist. Holloway attached the Royal 
label to a generalized pride in Canada’s military history: ‘it [“Royal Canadian Navy”] is 
the name under which we had the third largest navy in the world at one point’.36 
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Holloway applied the logic that since all naval ships were called ‘Her Majesty’s 
Canadian ship’ and since all naval personnel swore allegiance to Her Majesty, then it was 
logical to refer to the navy as The Royal Canadian Navy. Senator Mitchell rejected that 
perspective, arguing that just because an institution swore allegiance to the Queen, did 
not necessarily imply that it would be called Royal.37 
 
These attempts to shift the ground of the signifieds and referents of ‘Royal’ were 
contradicted by those, including Senator Mitchell, who argued: ‘To me, it just drags us 
back into the past and belies that effort, those accomplishments and many of the great 
moments in Canadian military history’.38 Mitchell’s rhetorical tactic here was to link the 
concept of an independent and non-royal navy tradition to the chosen glories of a 
mythologized Canadian military greatness, thereby calling into question the monopoly of 
the royalists in claiming this connection. Mitchell further claimed that ‘ “Royal” conjured 
up an era of a shroud of colonialism that covered Canada and does not reflect the present 
era’ and ‘I cannot see how “Royal” in front of “Canadian Navy” can in any way, shape or 
form enhance, inspire greater pride than simply “Canadian” all by itself. Why do we need 
a crutch?’39  In 2011, the Harper Conservatives re-named Canada’s navy and air forces to 
include the word Royal.40 Those who criticized the move regarded it as a backward step 
to the days of Canada as a dominion of the British Empire. The government followed this 
up in 2013 by discontinuing the use of the term Canadian Forces and returning to the 
expression Canadian Armed Forces. 
 
This was a further move toward renaming the military in more martial terms. Also in 
2013, the Harper government ordered the removal of maple leaf rank designations from 
Canadian uniforms, restoring the British army pips that were in use on Canadian 
uniforms until the 1960s.41 In each of these steps, the government occluded the history of 
the Canadian navy under the decades of the liberal social order and symbolically 
reinvented the glories of the British connection and the Manichean perspective of Canada 




The renewed Royal Canadian Navy reimagined battle fleets aggressively defending 
supply lines rather than taking part in peacekeeping patrols and goodwill missions. The 
renaming exercise for the navy was connected to Harper’s Northern Vision and assertive 
claims to Arctic sovereignty. This vision recalled the Prime Ministership of Conservative 
John Diefenbaker, who held power prior to Pearson and Trudeau, was an anglophile and 
promoter of the Commonwealth, and who himself promoted a Northern vision. It further 
linked to the social conservative and Cold War rhetoric of fighting the Russians, this time 
for access to shipping ways opened up by climate change and, consequently to potential 
new sources of fossil fuels.  
 
Renaming Canada’s National Museum  
 
Croft makes reference to the manner in which museums perform identity work ‘to 
construct and maintain a personal narrative and in so doing, to sustain ontological 
security’.42 The passage of Bill C-7, the Canadian Museum of History Act in 2013 was 
ostensibly a routine updating and renewal of the federal heritage mandate and presented 
as little more than applied good sense. Its major provision changed the name of Canada’s 
largest museum from the ‘Canadian Museum of Civilization’ to the ‘Canadian Museum 
of History’.43 However, some key stakeholders, including the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers, the Canadian Historical Society and the Canadian Anthropology 
Society, testified before the Senate that the museum would disproportionately focus on 
Canada’s military past. 
 
The changes took place in the broader context of the Harper government’s lionization and 
mythologizing of certain historical events, including the War of 1812 between the United 
States and Great Britain. The War became a new founding myth regarding the Canadian 
nation and its celebration an invented tradition. Harper wrote:  
 
I invite all Canadians to share in our history and commemorate our proud and 
brave ancestors who fought and won against enormous odds….The War helped 
establish our path toward becoming an independent and free country, united under 
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the Crown, with a respect for linguistic and ethnic diversity. The heroic efforts of 
Canadians then helped define who we are today, what side of the border we live 
on, and which flag we salute.44 
 
Behind this revisionism was an attempt to reframe Canada’s multicultural heritage from 
civic pluralism and the setting of the liberal social agenda to a social conservative 
referencing of Canada as a fulfillment of its British colonial roots in a Manichean 
reassertion of borders. In this effort, many Canadian agencies were enlisted, including 
Heritage Canada, National Defence, Parks Canada, Canada Post, and Library and 
Archives Canada.45 Both the language of Bill C-49 (an earlier version of Bill C-7 that 
died on the order paper) and the Minister of Canadian Heritage, James Moore, stated that 
the programming of the new museum would focus on Canada’s history and identity 
rather than ‘anthropology and different civilizations’.46 Moore’s speech to the House of 
May 22 2013 was replete with the rhetoric of nostalgia and chosen glories and the 
construction of national myths: ‘Canada needs a national institution that celebrates our 
achievements and what we have accomplished together as Canadians. Our children need 
to know more about Canada’s past’.47  
 
Moore employed similar rhetoric in his communication with the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage in which he outlined the Harper government’s 
plans to celebrate Canada’s 150th anniversary in 2017: 
 
The road to Canada’s 150th birthday offers us an unprecedented opportunity to 
celebrate our history and the achievements that define who we are as Canadians. 
Recognizing anniversaries such as the bicentennial of Sir George-Etienne 
Cartier’s birth, the centennial of the start of the First World War, the 75th 
anniversary of the start of the Second World War and the bicentennial of Sir John 
A. Macdonald’s birth encourages Canadians to gain a true sense of our nation’s 
history and reaffirms our pride in our achievements. Our government is proud to 
invest in projects that contribute to our collective identity and define who we are 





Moore’s language reflected the social conservatism of the Harper government in its focus 
on two historical wars and two prominent conservative politicians of the past. In an 
ideological bid, Moore claimed this as ‘true’ and central to the constitution of Canada’s 
national identity and history. There was no mention of the historical fate of Canada’s 
First Nations, the lives of immigrants, the poor or women, and Canada of the past 50 
years was not referenced. A debate on the renaming of the museum took place on June 5 
2013. Minister of Canadian Heritage, James Moore, opened the proceedings by declaring 
‘There is nothing ideological about this. It’s actually quite straightforward’.49 
 
This is the classic defence of all ideologues and is in fact a central aspect of hegemonic 
work: to claim that one’s own position is mere good sense and business as usual occupies 
a rhetorical centre ground for whatever is being promoted. The strongest critic of the 
proposed renaming was James Turk, a witness to the Committee and Executive Director 
of the Canadian Association of University Teachers. Turk began by pointing out that 
there had been very little contact with professional historians, anthropologists and 
archaeologists in the deliberations leading up to the name change. Pointing to changes in 
the language of the Act in comparison to the one it replaced, Turk pointed out that 
references to ‘the research and knowledge advancement function of the museum is under 
threat’.50 Turk further pointed out that: 
 
The new act will replace the museum’s emphasis on human cultural achievements 
and human behavior with “ […] events, experiences, people and objects that 
reflect and have shaped Canada’s history and identity […] ”. It’s a troubling 
emphasis on dates, heroes, and objects, an approach that historians have moved 
well beyond. The great man/great woman version of history risks leaving out the 
experience of the vast majority of Canadians [….] Other concerns are the 
elimination or marginalization of the history and culture of first nations people, 
and of issues of colonization, industrialization, gender relations, migration, 




Turk made reference to widespread cuts in the budgets of Library and Archives Canada, 
Parks Canada, the closure of federal department libraries, reduction in public access to 
libraries, elimination of inter-library loans at the National Library and the elimination of 
grants for local and regional archives. In the context of these broad cuts to programs and 
institutions as well as the lack of consultation and unilateral moves by the government, 
Turk stated that: 
 
The decision to transform the Canadian Museum of Civilization seems part of a 
pattern that suggests the government’s interest in using history to serve its own 
political agenda [….] The celebration of the War of 1812 was the transformation 
of a rather tawdry series of skirmishes into some defining characteristic of 
Canada’s history. The rewriting of the study guide for people who want to 
become new citizens […] is a celebration of heroes, warriors, with pictures of 
warrior events [….] It’s the glorification of the monarchy […].52 
 
Turk’s reference to citizenship and the monarchy linked renaming the Museum of 
Civilization as the Museum of History both to the renaming of the Canadian navy and to 
the reforms in the Citizenship Act, which we consider next. In all three instances, the 
common link, as Turk observed, was to render history and memory in the service of 
specific metnarratives of past glories and social conservative discourses. Among 
Immigration Minister, Jason Kenney’s senior advisors in redrafting the Canadian 
citizenship guide - to which Turk refers - was Chris Champion, whose book stressed the 
enduring characteristics of the British connection and downplayed the achievements of 
the Pearson/Trudeau decades.53   
 
Reframing the Citizenship Act 
 
The new Citizenship Act, passed as Bill C-24 in June 2014. Its central provisions 
included the requirement that applicants for citizenship demonstrate ‘knowledge of 
Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship’.54 It further substantially 
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increased the residency requirements of permanent residents in order to address the 
perceived challenge of Canadians of convenience, those who were not physically present 
in Canada throughout most of the waiting period. The Act also tightened up the 
regulations around the revocation of citizenship, extending it to those who had been 
convicted of treason, terrorist or other serious offences. In practical terms, this could only 
apply to dual citizens, including some who had been born and lived exclusively in 
Canada. This in essence created a second class of Canadian citizenship, one that applied 
to those with dual nationalities, some of whom might potentially face the prospect of 
exile. According to Barbara Jackman of the Canadian Bar Association such changes to 
the rights of dual nationals were probably unconstitutional.55 
 
The issue of constitutionality was raised in Question Period in the House by NDP MP 
Andrew Cash, who said: ‘Mr. Speaker, what is clear is that this bill proposes new powers 
to deport a Canadian-born citizen to a country to which they have no connection. This is 
nonsensical, and it is most likely unconstitutional’.56 In response, the Minister accused 
the NDP of underestimating the threat to Canada caused by ‘terrorists, traitors and 
spies’.57 
 
These issues were further elaborated in the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, 
Science and Technology on June 17, 2014. In the debate on the Citizenship Bill, Senator 
Eggleton stated: ‘One of our witnesses, Lorne Waldman, pointed out that this bill is 
creating two classes of citizens: Those who were born here and are free to travel, take 
jobs, go have their education wherever they want, stay as long as they want; and then 
there are those who are naturalized citizens, who could be accused of misrepresenting 
their intent to reside and as a result could lose their citizenship’.58 
 
Reframing the Citizenship Act exhibits elements of what Vivienne Jabri argues is 
colonialism on a transnational scale: ‘We might say that where the colony in modernity 
was subject to conquest, the postcolony is subjected to the post-panoptic 
governmentalizing manifestation of power, where populations and not simply 
individuals, are shaped and regulated into governable, manageable entities’.59 In the 
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context of other securitizing moves, the Citizenship Act was premised on the basis of a 
master narrative of global insecurity, evidenced in the dual citizen approach to citizenship 
revocation, as well as the attempt to re-enchant a Eurocentric view of Canadianism. Such 
provisions favoured the European communities and Western immigrants and were 
bolstered by a substantial increasing in the cost of applications for citizenship as well as 




The renamings of Canada’s armed forces to include a Royal Canadian Navy and 
Canada’s largest and most important museum as the Canadian Museum of History, as 
well as the ongoing legislation to tighten up citizenship controls and regulation in 
Canada, were expressions of steps designed to securitize subjectivity. These were 
implemented by the Harper Conservatives in the context of re-enchanting a mythical 
Canada of the past, grounded in the British connection, muscular militarism and loyalty 
to the Crown. This version of Canada attempted to reshape the regime of signification in 
such a way as to privilege social conservative readings of history and to diminish the 
impact of the pre-existing liberal social order. The new version of history was of kings 
and queens, heroic deeds and wars, in which Canada of the past was again a dominion of 
the British Empire. Strategically taken into the contemporary era, this promoted a 
Canadian nation that rejected what the Harper government regarded as the moral 
relativism and neutrality of the liberal social order and replaced it with a robust and 
Manichean world view of a set of core Canadian values, represented in the new 
citizenship requirements, in which Canada’s borders were securitized through stringent 
and differential requirements for dual citizens and new Canadians as they were immersed 
into a set of specific ‘Canadian values’. 
 
Further supporting this was a national Museum of History, which while as a government 
agency it retained its official freedom from interference in the running of its day-to-day 
operations, had been recast as a showcase for past glories, promoting an Anglo-centric 
ethnicity, rather than an institution devoted to the critical questioning of Canada’s past, 
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an institution whose renaming took place without extensive contact with experts in 
history, archaeology and anthropology. The resurrection of the royal connection and the 
renaming of the navy and air force made use of the re-enchantment afforded by royal 
tours and the romance associated with the British class system to securitize Canada’s 
place in the world, to recall heroic acts of the past and to reframe the military as 
masculinized armed forces prepared to attack the enemy and protect ‘our values and 
freedoms’.  
 
The Harper Conservative’s bid to transform Canadian political culture and institutions 
reached its apogee in the federal election campaign of August to October, 2015. Locked 
into a challenging three-way contest, the Conservatives introduced a series of cultural 
wedge issues around security, ethno-racial differences, cultural politics and immigration. 
These were designed to shore up their support base. Measures included: A dramatic 
securitization of immigration, refugee and citizenship policy, in which the spectre of the 
terrorist loomed large: the implementation of a ‘barbaric cultural practices tip line’; 60 and 
a ban on the wearing of the Niqab at citizenship ceremonies. The Conservatives lost the 
election and while their socially conservative initiatives might have solidified their base 
of support, it is evident that they were largely unsuccessful in undermining core liberal 
social values, at least in English-speaking Canada.  
 
Given the defeat of the Harper Conservatives in the federal election of 2015 and the new 
administration of the Liberal Party of Canada under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, it 
remains to be seen how effective have been the various attempts at institutional reframing 
and cultural transformation of the Harper decade. The prominence of a range of socially 
conservative and securitizing policy pronouncements during the campaign and their 
evident inability to convert Canadian voters, indicates that the liberal social order remains 
dominant in at least English-speaking Canada. A national survey by the Environics 
Institute in October 2016, a year after the victory of the Trudeau Liberals and following 
the arrival of 31,000 Syrian refugees into Canada, demonstrated that attitudes toward 
immigration among the Canadian public had grown more positive.61 The proportion 
expressing concern that immigrants were not adopting ‘Canadian values’ was ‘the lowest 
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recorded in more than 20 years’. Equally, the proportion of those believing that 
‘immigration controls are effective in keeping out criminals’ was the highest in over 20 
years. The Harper project was desecuritized throughout the election campaign in a 
manner similar to the two-fold process described by Rumelili.62 The threat of physical 
security concerns was substantially diminished, while the core sense of ontological 
security associated with the liberal social order was re-instituted. Rumelili identifies the 
challenges associated with such processes of desecuritization when he asks: ‘How may 
Self/Other relations be re-configured to remove the perception of threat while 
maintaining the distinctions necessary for security-of-being?’63 The answer, at least in the 
ascendancy of the Trudeau Liberal Party and its victory over the Harper Conservatives, is 
that in the Canadian context, categorizations and identifications of Self and Other in the 
tradition of the liberal social order have a longstanding grounding in multiculturalism, in 
which differences are already recognized and affirmed as equal, mutually supportive, and 
integrated into a larger civic unity.  
 
As the eldest son of former Liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, whose administration 
ushered in many key liberal social policy shifts, current Canadian Prime Minister, Justin 
Trudeau fought the 2015 election campaign on the repeated rhetorical invocation of a 
positive politics of inclusion and hope set against the negative politics of division and 
fear. In the immediate aftermath of the election, the new Trudeau administration set about 
dismantling elements of the symbolic order of the Harper administration. Throughout 
their first year in office, the Trudeau Liberal government has systematically dismantled 
and reversed substantial elements of the Harper Conservative legacy. Bill C-24, The 
Citizenship Act, has been repealed. The Trudeau administration ordered the removal of 
the portrait of HM The Queen in the lobby of the Foreign Affairs building and their 
replacement with two Canadian coastal landscapes that originally hung in the same spot. 
For now at least, Canadians have supported the avowedly desecuritizing entrepreneur of 
identity, rather than his securitizing counterpart. In so doing, Canadians have opted for 
the postcolonial possibilities of an open and diverse regime rather than for the social 
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